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In every field of law, courts, litigants and lawyers con-
stantly confront the problem of describing human and business
events in terms that are relevant to the particular legal issue
involved. In taxation, this search is most often described as
one for the substance of transactions as opposed to their
forms. But this is a special type of reality, it is reality in a
context, the context being the law of taxation. When Mrs.
Gregory's wholly owned corporation, United Mortgage Corpo-
ration, organized a new subsidiary to which it transferred
shares of stock in Monitor Securities Corporation, these were
real events; they did take place. But in the context of the tax
law they were considered formalities of no consequence in
describing the real substance of the tax transaction.
The step transaction doctrine is the name that has been
given to one method courts have used in fitting events into
the descriptions provided by the statute for taxable transac-
tions. The use of this method occurs over and over in the reso-
lution of tax cases. Sometimes the courts describe what they
have done as an application of the step transaction doctrine;
sometimes they make no mention of it. But the method is so
frequently encountered in corporate tax cases that to cata-
logue all of such cases would be a monumental undertaking
and unlikely to be very useful. On the other hand, a study of
examples of the use of this method by the courts is helpful in
understanding the Internal Revenue Code.2
tProfessor of Law, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.
1 This reference is to the taxpayer and the facts of Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 55 S.Ct. 266 (1935).
2Credit must be given to Paul and Zimet, Step Transactions, in
SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (2d Series 1938)
200, and Mints & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reoirganiza-
tions, Proc. 12 NYU Ann. Inst. on Fed. Tax 247 (1953) for collecting
many of the early cases, as well as presenting excellent analysis of
the doctrine.
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In a broad sense, the step transaction doctrine might be
thought of as being involved in four definitional situations.
Most common is the combining of two or more steps into a
single transaction described by the statute. Or, as it is some-
times put, the law will not permit what is essentially a single
transaction to be broken up into component parts with each
of the component steps being given independent significance.
The Gregory case,3 decided by the Supreme Court in 1935, is
a classic example of the use of this method, even though the
decision makes no mention of "step transaction doctrine." In
deciding whether the sequence of the events which took place
constituted a "reorganization" the Court combined four steps,
the formation of a subsidiary, the transfer of securities to
it, a distribution of the stock of the subsidiary and then a
liquidation of the newly organized company. As a single trans-
action, it was merely a distribution of securities which the
corporation had owned prior to formation of the subsidiary.
Looked at in this way, the transaction did not fit the statute's
definition of a reorganization.4
This treatment of events as only steps, having no indepen-
dent tax significance, of a single transaction is frequently all
that is meant when the phrase "step transaction doctrine" is
used. But other types of cases are closely related. The coi
rolary of combining several steps into a single transaction to
take a single event and characterize it as actually involving two
or more tax significant transactions. The classic case of Eisner
v. Macomber5 was fought on this ground. The dissenting opin-
ion of Justice Brandeis argued that the same result as a stock
dividend was often achieved by a distribution of a cash dividend
along with a rights offering to stockholders. The exercies of the
rights by either the stockholders or purchasers of the rights
would then return to the corporation the same amount of capi-
tal which had been distributed as a dividend. He believed the
stock dividend should be viewed in this manner. Both Justice
Pitney for the majority and Justice Brandeis in dissent spoke
of the need to determine the real substance of the transaction,
but they differed on this crucial point of whether the single
3 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 55 S.Ct. 266 (1935).
4 Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1517 (1968) is a
iecent example of a refusal to combine two events into one distribution
transaction. See discussion at note 106, infra.
6252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189 (1920).
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transaction should be viewed as involving steps having inde-
pendent tax significance.*
In a third type of case, several transactions are consider-
ed by the courts to have occurred in different sequence. Thus,
in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.7 the Supreme Court
found that, even though a corporation first liquidated and its
assets were then sold, in the context of the tax law the sale
.of assets had in fact preceded the liquidation.8 The sharehold-
ers were viewed simply as the conduit through which title was
paksed.
Finally, the determination of what steps or events, actually
constitute the transaction described by the tax law frequently
enters into a determination of the character of the taxable
event. Thus, in the Arrowsmith case,9 the payment by a stock
holder of a judgment against a corporation four years after
the corporation had been liquidated was considered by the
Court to be but one step in the liquidation transaction; thus,
it characterized the loss as a capital loss instead of an ordi-
nary business loss of the stockholder. In this case, the Court
did not speak of the step transaction doctrine, but it still used
the same method in defining the liquidation transaction. It
said that "The Commissioner viewed the 1944 payment as part
of the original liquidation transaction requiring classification
as a capital loss". The taxpayer argued that this would violate
the principle of an annual accounting for income taxes and
the Court answered, "But this principle is not breached by
considering all the 1937-1944 liquidation transaction events in
6In U.S. v. Joliet and Chicago Railroad, 315 U.S. 44, 62 S.Ct. 442
(1942), the Court did apply this corollary of the rule. The taxpayer
had leased property, directing that rents be paid direct to its share-
holders. Each rent payment was treated by the Court as involving two
independent transactions, one, a payment of rent to the taxpayer and,
two, a distribution of a dividend to taxpayer's shareholders.
Consider also the Commissioner's attempt to treat a charitable con-
tribution by a corporation as a dividend to the shareholder and a
contribution by him. Rev. Rul. 68-658, IRB., 1968-53, p. 10.
7 324 U.S. 331, 65 S.Ct. 707 (1945). This case has, among other
places, been cited as involving step transaction doctrine in West Coast
Marketing Co., 46 T.C. 32, 41 (1966).
9 This type of decision could also fit into the second type such as
that in U.S. v. Joliet and Chicago Railroad Co., supra note 6, by con-
sidering the event of sale to consist of two transactions, a sale by the
corporation and then a distribution in liquidation.
9 344 U.S. 6, 73 S.Ct. 71 (1952).
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order properly to classify the nature of the 1944 loss for tax
purposes."
Many of the reorganization cases that are said to in.
volve an application of the step transaction doctrine are ex-
amples of this fourth type of case. The reorganization trans-
action itself is not taxable; Section 368 only defines "reorgani-
zations." The taxable (or nontaxable) transactions are the
exchanges of stock, securities and other property described
in sections 854, 362 and 856. Thus, when a determination is
made that certain steps are parts of a single transaction which
fits the definition of a reorganization, this determination only
helps to characterize the tax treatment to be given to the
various exchanges.
Development of the step transaction doctrine has been
largely the result of -its use by the courts. However, the role
of the statute should not be minimized when one attempts to
reconcile the cases. The statute describes the transaction which
has tax significance. Thus, the courts, using the step trans-
action doctrine, must wrestle with a particular statutory de-
scription. Some transactions described by the Code almost
always involve many individual events. Examples abound in
the various reorganization provisions. These are normally com-
plex transactions, requiring many individual events. Thus,
when deciding whether several steps constitute integral parts
of a single reorganization transaction, courts may quite will-
ingly accept a rather loose or tenuous nexus among them as
enough cement to bind them together. But when a court is
faced with determining whether a corporation has made a "dis-
tribution" or whether a "sale" has occurred, it may be quite re-
luctant to combine several steps into one, because the statu-
tory term with which it is dealing is normally thought of as
involving a single event.10 That is undoubtedly the reason for
10 For example, compare Walter S. Heller, 2 T.C. 371 (1943) (or-
ganization of new corporation to purchase assets of old which was
then liquidated, a substantial change in proportional interests occur-
ing) where the Tax Court puts great emphasis on the net effect of
the series of steps because they were taken pursuant to a plan, with
Waterman Steamship Corp., 50 T.C. 650 (1968) (on appeal 5th Cir.)
(an intercorporate tax free dividend occurred simultaneously with a
sale of the subsidiary at greatly reduced price from that which pur-
chaser had offered) where the Tax Court, considering the substance
of a "sale" transaction refused to integrate the dividend with the
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the Supreme Court's recent decision in the Gordon case,," as
it involved an interpretation of Section 355's use of the term
"distribution," a type of transaction commonly achieved with
a single event. It would not combine two distributions in dif-
ferent years and treat them as a single transaction unless the
second step must necessarily have been taken once the first
step occurred.'2
The determination of what events or steps shall be con-
sidered as part of a particular transaction involves, as well,
a determination as to what events should be excluded from
the transaction. The exclusion of events (which may seem
closely related to a particular transaction) can produce sur-
prising results at times and today the Commissioner and the
courts are giving greater attention to the potential of this
type of analysis of transactions. The leading example of what
may result is furnished by the Supreme Court's decision in
Bazley v. Commissioner." That case held that the distribution
of securities accompanying an exchange of stock in the Bazley
corporation was a step independent of the recapitalization or
stock exchange transaction,14 thus acquiring independent tax
significance as a dividend. The Commissioner, relying on the
Badey case, took a similar position in Rev. Rul. 61-15615 deal-
transfer of stock notwithstanding the step had no purpose other than
to reduce tax, was clearly taken pursuant to the plan to sell the
subsidiary and coincided in time with the sale.
11391 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1517 (1968).
12In Gordon, Pacific Telephone and Telegraph spun off a new
subsidiary through a series of two rights offerings to its shareholders.
At the time of the first offering the plan was to distribute all the
stock in this manner, but the time for completing it was uncertain
and the corporation was not bound to do so. The balance of the stock
was, however, distributed via a rights offering in a later year. The
Supreme Court refused to combine the two distributions into one in
the absence of a binding commitment at the time of the first rights
offering that the remaining stock would be distributed within a certain
time period.
a 331, U.S. 737, 67 S.Ct. L*89 (1947).
14The Court apparently rejected a holding that a recapitalization
for tax purposes had been achieved, but nevertheless there was an
exchange of stock for stock and boot in such transaction would have
been taxable pursuant to sections 112 (b) (2) and 112 (c) (1) of the
1939 Code, the predecessors of sections 1036 and 1031(b) of the 1954
Code
151961-2 C.B. 62. See the discussion infra at note 97.
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ing with a liquidation-reincorporation type transaction. Al-
though the Commissioner combined a number of steps to find
that a reorganization had occurred, he excluded a planned
public sale of stock in arriving at that conclusion, and he ex-
cluded what would have appeared to be a boot distribution,
thus requiring it to be taxed under section 301 instead of
under section 356. In this way he escaped the dividend-with-
in-gain limitation of section 356 (a) (2). Recently the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted the same approach in
defining the reorganization transaction in Reef Corp. v. Com-
missioner1' and in determining the amount of the dividend
distribution in Davant v. Commissioner. 1
Not only does the statute describe the various transac-
tions, thus creating the context within which the courts use
the step transaction doctrine, but in many instances the statute
itself codifies the doctrine for specific situations. For example,
the wash sales provisions combine two steps, one of which nega-
tives the other." The result is the same as a finding that the
event of sale did not take place, and that there was no taxable
transaction. Another example can be seen in section 302 (b)
(2) (D) of the Code, which combines a series of redemptions
into a single stock redemption transaction in order to test
whether the redemption is the equivalent of a dividend.
Because of the fact that the step transaction doctrine must
deal with a variety of statuory transactions, it is difficult to
generalize about the doctrine. One cannot set down any one
particular test to determine whether the doctrine will be ap-
plied or rejected by a court. Nevertheless, some tests are fre-
quently applied and can be identified, even though it is neces-
sary to examine the treatment of particular issues to deter-
mine how important any one test may be in predicting the out-
come of a case. Perhaps the test most frequently articulated by
the courts is one described by Randolph Paul and Philip Zimet
in their 1937 epsay on step transactions."' That is the mutual
interdependency of the steps. Paul and Zimet stated this as re-
quiring a determination of whether "the steps were so inter-
dependent that the legal relations created by one transaction
would have been fruitless without a completion of the series."
The Tax Court clearly articulated this as the reason for its
16 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966).
11866 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966).
18 I.R.C. §1091,
19 Paul and Zimet, Step Transactions, loc. cit., supra n. 2.
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decision in American Bantam Car Co., 20 refusing to accept
the taxpayer's argument that a transfer of assets to a subsid-
iary failed to qualify for nonrecognition treatment under sec-
tion 112 (b) (5) as the result of a later transfer of stock to an
underwriter as his fee for a public issue of stock. The corpo-
ration had argued that the public issue, being contemplated
under the plan for organizing the subsidiary, should be treated
as part of the transaction, in which event stock being obtained
by the underwriters would have resulted in a failure to meet
the test of control immediately after the transfer.
Paul and Zimet also described several other factors which
at least get involved in the rhetoric used by courts in deal-
ing with step transactions. They are that the intent of the
parties, the time factor and the ultimate result of the steps
may also have a bearing on whether to combine the steps into
a single transaction.2' There is little question today that steps
can be separated by substantial periods of time and still be
considered parts of a single transaction. The intent of the
parties was dismissed by Paul and Zimet as of little use and,
indeed, the purpose of the steps, i.e., whether they are for
separate business reasons or whether they all serve a single
purpose, has become a more accurate way of viewing this
factor. Finally, the net effect of the steps or their ultimate
result is sometimes used by courts to rationalize a result.
However, this is a determination that must be made in every
step transaction case after the determination has been made
that the steps must be combined.2 2 Thus it hardly serves as
a reason for integrating the steps in the first place.
Closely related to the mutual interdependence test is that
of business purpose. If there is an independent business pur-
pose for each step, then that step would not appear fruitless
even if the contemplated series of steps is not completed. The
corollary to this is that if avoidance of tax is the motivation
for taking the several steps, then one step may not appear to
be fruitful unless the se, is completed. Thus, in H. B. Zachry
Co.,23 a company had organized a subsidiary, transferring an
2011 T.C. 397 (1948), aff'd 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949).
21 These are further developed by Mintz & Plumb, loe. cit., supra
n. 2, pp. 249-50.
22 The Tax Court has made this point in Southwell Combing Co.,
30 T.C. 487, 498 (1958) where it said, "Where the facts warrant the
integration of a series of steps into one, it is the situation at the
beginning and at the end of the series which determines whether there
has been a statutory reorganization, or merely a taxable exchange."
2849 T.C. 73 (1967) (appeal to 5th Cir. dismissed).
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oil payment to it in exchange for its stock. The subsidiary then
made a loan secured by the oil payment and used the cash
proceeds to buy preferred stock issued by the parent. Without
offering persuasive reasoning the Court held that there were
independent business reasons for each of these steps and gave
them independent tax significance. 24 Contrasted with this is
the recent case of George A. Nye,25 where the taxpayer orga-
nized a corporation one day and sold business assets to it the
next. The taxpayer, in explanation, offered only a single busi-
ness purpose to explain the transactions, and this purpose was
one which related to the entire plan, the protection against
credit risks. As a result the Tax Court found that the sale
and the purchase of stock were so closely related as to require
them to be combined in a single section 351 transaction.
Nevertheless a tax avoidance motive is not always fatal, as
witnessed by Waterman Steamship Corp.s And in some in-
stances the Internal Revenue Service even gives helpful ad-
vice on the form with which to clothe a transaction in order
to avoid a tax.N
The fact that steps are taken pursuant to a plan is
usually enough to bind them together in determining whether
a reorganization has occurred, but this test is employed occa-
sionally in nonreorganization contexts as well." Of course, if
24 See also Weyl-Zlckerman & Co., 23 T.C. 841 (1955) aff'd 282
F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1956) where a sale of mineral rights was con-
templated by a corporate taxpayer. It organized a subsidiary to which
it transferred the tract of land for stock in a section 351 transaction.
Six months later, the subsidiary distributed the mineral rights as a
dividend, the purpose being to get a stepped-up basis prior to the
sale. Because of this tax avoidance motive for the sequence of trans-
fers the Court combined them and refused to give the mineral rights
the hoped-for basis.
2650 T.C. 203 (1968).
2
*Supra, n. 10.
2 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-172, I.R.B. 1969-10, p. 10, describing how
to avoid a double tax on the sale of a subsidiary's assets.
25An example of how these tests may blend is furnished by Baker
Commodities, Inc. 48 T.C. 374 (1967), aff'd -F.2d- (9th Cir. 1968).
The rationale of the Tax Court in binding steps together was phrased
in terms of being carried out pursuant to a plan. But, the purpose of
the plan was to organize a new corporation to take over the assets of
a partnership. Thus, although the organization of the company clearly
accomplished something of substance, it was fruitless in carrying out
the purpose of the plan without the subsequent purchase of partner-
ship assets. See discussion, infra, and cf. Stevens Pass, Inc., 48 T.C.
582 (1967), appeal dismissed -F.2d- (9th Cir. 1968).
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the plan itself has a certain tax avoidance or business motive
which cannot be consummated without carrying out the en-
tire plan, then this test tends to shade into the mutu4l inter-
dependence test as the initial steps would be fruitless, in the
context of the particular purpose, without completing the plan.
This, however, does not appear to be quite what Paul and
the courts have intended when speaking of mutual interde-
pendence. They speak of whether the legal relations would
be fruitless if the series is not completed. Yet one may ques-
tion whether this is meaningful without considering the pur-
poses of each step as well as the purpose of the overall plan.
In speaking of mutual interdependence, the courts normally
mean something more than that the step simply creates a new
or different legal relationship. To speak of it being fruitful,
they must be making reference to being fruitful in accom-
plishing some purpose. Is the purpose, then, one which is
dominated by a single purpose for a planned course of ac-
tion, or is it the purpose, a separate business purpose, of that
particular step.
The functional independence of a particular event has
been said to be the evolving rationale for excluding that event
from a transaction even though it may be closely related to
it.29 Thus if the particular event is unnecessary to a finding
that a transaction occurred (such as a reorganization in the
Reef case)30 then the event may be excluded from the trans-
action if it can be seen to serve a separate function. It is pos-
sible to view this as a makeweight argument in some cases
because, if inclusion of the step would have resulted in the
claimed transaction not occuring, as would have been the case
in Reef, then the reason for excluding the step must rest on
some other ground. However, where exclusion of the step
would not change the finding that the particular transaction
occurred, but only alter the tax result of the step in question,
then the functional independence test might be of greater util-
ity. For example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals would
have found that a reorganization occurred in the liquidation-
reincorporation type case presented by Davant,3a no matter
what position it took with regard to the events that resulted
"oPugh, "The F Reorganization: Reveille For A Sleeping Giant?",
24 Tax L. Rev. 437, 445 (1969).
3o Supra, n. 16.
ai Supra, n. 17.
110
TULANE TAX INSTITUTE
in a withdrawal of cash. But, by excluding the cash with-
drawals, from the reorganization transaction, the Court caused
this distribution to be treated under section 301 as a simple
dividend, rather than as a boot distribution under section 356.
Finally, in some types of cases, courts require not only
interdependence, but some type of commitment that once the
first step is taken the others will follow. Thus, in the recent
Gordon case,"2 the Supreme Court indicated that it would have
required a binding commitment running between the corpora-
tion and its stockholders to distribute the balance of the stock
of its subsidiary in order to find that two distributions were
part and parcel of a single section 355 distribution of stock.
Thus, the court may in one case permit the mere existence
of a plan contemplating each of the steps to be the reason
for tying them together in one transaction, and in another
case require binding commitments that all steps will be taken.
Falling somewhere between these extremes are the cases tha
turn on mutual interdependence or business purpose tests.
Which one will be applied in a given case frequently depends
on the provision of the Code which is in issue. But one
wonders whether the courts may not also be somewhat af-
fected by whether it is the taxpayer or the Commissioner who
is seeking application of the doctrine. It is generally said, to-
day, that the doctrine is applicable without regard to which
party is claiming its application.33 In the Gallagher case" the
Tax Court combined a number of steps taken pursuant to a
plan to avoid dividend treatment of a stock redemption and
to find that there was no reorganization in a liquidation-re-
incorporation type situation. Thus the Tax Court helped the
taxpayer to an extremely favorable tax result through an ap-
plication of the step transaction doctrine. And recently in
Weinert's Estate v. Commissioner,5 the Court said, ".... re-
sort to substance is not a right reserved for the Commissioner's
exclusive benefit to use or not to use--depending on the
32 Supra, n. 11.
33 Mintz & Plunmb, loc. cit. supra n. 2, p. 248.
4 39 T.C. 144 (1962).
35 294 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961). And it is interesting to note
that as early as Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189 (1920),
the Court used what it viewed as the substance of the transaction to
reject a tax on a stock dividend.
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amount of tax to be realized. The taxpayer too has a right to
assert the priority of substance." But in other situations the
courts will sometimes continue to revert to the idea that a
taxpayer is bound by the form which he gives to his transac-
tions,3* and it is impossible not to wonder whether this may
not occasionally affect a court's judgment as to whether it
takes a strict or lenient approach to the application of the
step transaction doctrine.
Application of Step Transaction Doctrine in Particular
Contexts
Section 882
The few cases decided under Section 332 where the Com-
missioner has attempted to combine several steps into a single
transaction have resulted in the courts giving short shrift to
the step transaction doctrine. The issue has arisen primarily
in situations where a corporation has wanted to avoid the non-
recognition provisions of Section 332 upon liquidating a sub-
sidiary.37 To accomplish this, the corporation makes a pre-
liquidation sale of a portion of the stock of the subsidiary in
order to divest itself of the eighty percent (80%) control.
In each of the litigated cases the corporation has ended up
in the same situation it would have been in had it simply
liquidated the subsidiary. The proceeds it received from the
sale of stock prior to the liquidation were a full substitute
for the consideration the corporation would have received up-
on liquidation. Were the court to have combined the event
of sale and the subsequent event of a liquidating distribution
into a single transaction, the liquidation of the subsidiary,
the effect would have been to ignore the event by which the
36 See, e.g., ACF-Brill Motors Co., 14 T.C. 263 (1950) as com-
pared with the Commissioner's position in a similar situation in Rev.
Rul. 69-48, I.R.B. 1969-6, p. 16 (parent company buys stock of X for
cash; then subsidiary acquires the assets of X for parent company's
stock and X is liquidated--steps are combined because of preexisting
plan) and Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Comm., 362 F.2d 781 (8th
Cir. 1966) aff'd 44 T.C. 74 (1965) (subsidiary buys gas, incurs trans-
mission expense and resells to parent-parent denied subsidiary's cost
as inventory value of gas).
7 Granite Trust Co. v. U. S., 238 F.2d 670 (1st Cir. 1956);
Comm. v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 151 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1945); Avco
Manufacturing Corp., 25 T.C. 975 (1956).
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corporation divested itself of control. Section 332 would then
have applied. But, in each case, the court has rejected the
application of the step transaction doctrine, notwithstanding
that the sale of stock took place after the corporation had
decided on the liquidation and that the sale was motivated by
no other reason than to obtain a tax advantage.
Here there was certainly a mutual interdependence be-
tween the steps. The sale of stock would not have served any
purpose to the corporation without the subsequent liquidation.
Furthermore, since the motivations for the sales were not
business-oriented and served strictly a tax purpose, there was
every reason, applying the general principles of step trans-
action doctrine, to accept the Commissioner's contention that
section 332 applied to the liquidation.
In this situation, however, the courts are dealing with
a section of the code which is highly formalistic in its pre-
scription of the transaction giving rise to non-recognition of
a gain or loss. In attempting to circumscribe the application
of this provision Congress used highly restrictive language
saying that it would apply "only if the cQrporation receiving
such property was, on the date of the adoption of the plan of
liquidation, and has continued to be at all times until the
receipt of the property, the owner of stock (in such other
corporations) possessing at least 80 percent of the total com-
bined voting power... "(emphasis supplied.) 3 8 In perhaps the
most extreme of these cases, Avco Manufactring Corp.,39
there was a transfer of stock following the adoption of the
plan of liquidation which the court could easily have ignored
as being de minimus; yet the formalism of the statute led
the court to a decision based on the form adopted by the tax-
payer.
On the other side of the issue, in a memorandum deci-
sion, the Board of Tax Appeals permitted a corporation to
acquire the controlling interest by purchase shortly before
the liquidation occurred.40 If the court had applied the step
transaction doctrine, combining the purchase of stock with
38 The predecessor to § 332, 112 (b) (6) did not differ materially
for purposes of this discussion.
** Supra, n. 37.
40 Metal Office Furniture Co., 1 42,337 P-H BTA Memo. Dec.
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the liquidation event, then the stockholder who sold his stock
to the parent corporation would be viewed as receiving a dis-
tribution in liquidation of the subsidiary and the parent com-
pany would not be viewed as having the requisite control at
the date of liquidation.4'
One would struggle fruitlessly to attempt the reconcilia-
tion of these case with other step transaction cases without
considering the statutory context in which they were decided.
Indeed, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in its decision in
the Granite Trust Company case,a explained its reversal of
the district court on this very ground, saying that the legisla-
tive history of Section 332 showed that this provision was not
intended to be an "end-result" section, but to have elective
features open to the taxpayer.
Section 351
The step transaction doctrine had much of its early de-
velopment in transactions governed by the predecessors to Sec-
tion 351 of the Code, relating to the transfer of property to
a controlled corporation. The doctrine has played an import-
ant role in the resolution of several types of issues which
arise under Section 351 and, because of differences in the
particular statutory provisions as well as the regulations, the
courts use of step transaction doctrine differs from one issue
to another, even within the context of Section 351.
One question importantly affected by the doctrine is what
persons shall be considered to be members of the control group.
Since the statute speaks in terms of a single transfer of prop-
erty to the corporation, but by one or more persons, it clearly
contemplates that the transaetion (the transfer of property)
may include more than a single event. The regulations of the
Commissioner have construed this liberally, saying that trans-
fers by two or more people will be treated as part of a single
Section 351 transaction if they occur in a situation where the
rights of the parties have been previously defined and the
execution of the agreement has proceeded with an expedition
41Cf. General Motors Corp., 35 BTA 523 (1937) (case settled on
appeal) -a reorganization case but involving a transistory acquisition of
stock prior to effecting an exchange of stock for assets.
4 2 Supra, n. 37.
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consistent with orderly procedure.43 On this particular 351
issue, the courts have perhaps been even more lenient. An
example is the Tax Court's decision in Baker Commodities,
Inc.4* where three partners, together with seven key employees
in the partnership organized a corporation, each contributing
$500, or ten per cent (109o/) of the capital stock of the corpo-
ration. The company then bought the partnership assets and
gave in exchange therefore what the Tax Court decided was
a security within the meaning of Section 351. It then held
that the exchange of partnership assets for securities was suf-
ficiently related to the original organization of the corpora-
tion to consider that the control group consisted of all ten
of the organizers in the corporation, not just the three part-
ners. Accordingly the court found that the second step was a
part of the Section 351 transaction.
A question as to whether control exists immediately after
the transfer of property has other potential issues than that
of the control group. A number of cases have dealt with the
problem of transfers of stock following the initial exchange
of the property for stock.45 Here again the statute is rather
formalistic because of its language that the control need exist
"immediately after the exchange" (emphasis supplied). Thus
it can be expected that courts would tend to reject the appli-
cation of step transaction doctrine and would not hold that
a subsequent transfer and the initial exchange of property for
a subsequent transfer of stock divested the original shareholder
of his control unless there was a very substantial transfer
and the initial exchange of property for stock. The American
Bantam Car Company,46 in rejecting the application of the
step transaction doctrine on this issue used the mutual inter-
dependence test; but it should be noted that it did not need
more than this in order to reject the use of the doctrine.
On the other hand, in May Broadcasting. Company v. U.-
S.,4' the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the doc-
trine, when it found that the subsequent sale of stock was
43 Reg. 1.351-1 (a) (1).
4 4 Supra, n. 28.
45 See cases collected in 54-3rd T.M., Transfers To Controlled Cor-
porations, pp. A-16 et. seq.
46 Supra, n. 20.
4?200 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1953).
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made pursuant to a binding written commitment in exist-
ence when the exchange took place. This has overtones of the
holding of the Supreme Court in the Gordon case and, with
that case as precedent, it seems predictable that courts will
tend to' take this strict view of the doctrine in subsequent
cases involving that issue.48
Where it appears that the subsequent transfer is con-
nected to the exchange only because of a plan, with no bind-
ing commitment to make the transfer, courts have not been
willing to combine the transfer with the exchange.49 In the
case of a gift of stock immediately following the exchange
courts have rejected the use of the doctrine.50 But on the other
hand where stock has been issued direct to a donee or a per-
son who is not in the control group, the form has been given
effect to disqualify the exchange of property for stock. This
was the holding of the Fifth Circuit in Fahs v. Florida Ma-
chinery Foundery Company.51 This is a situation where a
better result might be reached if the court were to apply the
corollary of the step transaction doctrine and find that the
single step of issuing stock to the donee actually involved two
transactions having independent tax significance, being, first,
the issuance of stock to the original shareholder and, second
a subsequent gift of that stock to his donee.52 The case would
then be more in harmony with the cases where an exchange
48 E.g., Manhattan Building Co.., 27 T.C. 1032 (1957).
o E.g., National Bellas Hess, 220 F.2d 415, 225 F.2d 340 (8th
Cir. 1955). But compare the position of the Commissioner in Rev.
Rul. 54-96, 1954-1 C.B. 111, modified by Rev. Rul. 56-100, 1956-1 C.B.
624 where a corporation organized a new subsidiary and then trans-
ferred the stock to a third corporation in exchange for its stock.
The two steps were taken pursuant to a plan, but there was no bind-
ing commitment to proceed with the second step. The Commissioner
said that "The two steps of the transaction... were part of" a pre-
arranged plan, and may not be considered independently of each other
... ", holding, as a result, that there was not the requisite control im-
mediately after the transfer in order to qualify under section 112(b)
(5) of the 1939 Code (Sec. 351, 1954 I.R.C.).
SOWilgard Realty Co. v. Comm., 127 F.2d 514 (2d Cir. 1942).
cert. den. 317 U.S. 655, 63 S.Ct. 52 (1942).
51168 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1948). See also Moonnier & Sons, 12
T.C. 887 (1949).
a See Comm. v. P. A. Birren & Sons, Inc., 116 F.2d 718 (7th Cir.
1940).
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of property for stock is followed immediately by a gift of
the stock to a donee; form would give way to substance.
The early development of the step transaction doctrine
can best be seen in a line of cases involving the question of
whether a particular transfer of property to the corporation
for cash or notes is a step in the Section 351 exchange or
whether it constitutes a separate sale of property to the cor-
poration. The early decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals
were extremely formalistic in permitting the separation of the
stock subscriptions from the sale of property.58 Generally these
cases involved situations where the taxpayer wanted to estab-
lish a loss on property which had depreciated in value. He
would organize a corporation and sell the loss property to the
new corporation. Frequently these two events would take place
simultaneously and the amount contributed to the corporation
for stock would be virtually identical in amount to the pur-
chase price of the property. Judge Murdock wrote some of the
earlier opinions in this field holding that the transactions were
indeed separate and to be given independent tax significance.
A typical example is the case of Seymour Knox" where the
taxpayer subscribed for 11,550 shares of a holding company
which had been organized to stabilize the market in the shares
of the Midland Bank. His stock subscription was paid on Nov-
ember 18 by a check in the amount of $402,426.25. At the
same time he was advised that the holding company would
buy 11,550 shares of the Midland Bank stock from him for
$407,137.50 and this sale took place the very next day. Other
individuals, also having losses on their Midland Bank shares,
did the same thing. The taxpayer deducted his loss of $247,-
000 on the sale of the Midland Bank stock and the Board of
Tax Appeals held that these steps were in fact separate and
permitted the deduction.
It seems likely that this line of cases may have had its
genesis in the case of Minnie Bracket5 where the check that
53 Saul, 4 B.T.A. 639 (1926); Minnie Bracket, 19 B.T.A. 1154
(1930) aff'd 57 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1931); Chandler Shipbuilding Co., 22
B.T.A. 5 (1981); J. Hampton Hoult, 24 B.T.A. 79 (1931); James
Wells, 29 B.T.A. 222 (1933); Hardwick, 33 B.T.A. 249 (1985); Knox,
88 B.T.A. 972 (1936); Contra: Labrot, 18 B.T.A. 332 (1929), aff'd
57 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
4 Supra, a. 63.
Ssupra, a. 53.
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the shareholder gave to the corporation for its stock , wasn't
even cashed, but was simply endorsed back to him in payment
for the property transferred to the corporation. In that case
it was the Commissioner who argued that the transactions
were independent and that the non-recognition provisions
should not apply. The Board of Tax Appeals accepted the
argument of the Commissioner and this was affirmed by the
decision of the Seventh Circuit in 1931. In subsequent deci-
sions, where taxpayers were trying to establish losses, Judge
Murdock seemed partcularly influenced by the fact that the
Government had been arguing for this position in the Bracket
case where this provided an advantage for the revenue. How-
ever, when Gunby, Inc.56 came before the Board of Tax Appeals
in 1940, Judge Murdock changed his view and wrote a dis-
senting opinion holding that the two events should be con-
sidered a part of a single transaction, thus preventing recog-
nition of gain or loss on the transfer of property to the corpo-
ration. This view was adopted by the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia. That reversal of the Board
appears to mark the transition from a refusal to apply the
step transaction doctrine in this context to a situation where
the doctrine is given substantial influence in the resolution of
such cases.
The early development may continue to linger, however,
as courts today sometimes phrase the issue not in terms of
the step transaction doctrine but on the question of whether
a "true sale" has been made to the corporation. In a case simi-
lar to Baker Commodities, Inc.57 and decided at very nearly
the same time, the Tax Court arrived at a diametrically oppo-
site result through this type of analysis.58 A new corporation
had been organized by some of the stockholders of the old
corporation and some new investors. The new corporation
then purchased the shares of stock of the old corporation and
liquidated it. The court held that the control group would
consist of all the stockholders of the new corporation and
thus it was presenied directly with the question of whether
the purchase of the shares of the old corporation was* one of
the steps of a section 351 transaction. On a finding that this
"41 B.T.A. 884 (1940), aff'd 122 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
A Supra, n. 28.
5 8 Stevens Pass, Inc., 48 T.C. 532 (1967). See also Charles E.
Curry, 43 T.C. 667 (1965).
118
TULANE TAX INSTITUTE
was a "true sale" the Tax Court took the transfer out of the
section 351 transaction without discussion of step transactions.
The result was a step up in basis of assets under section 384
(b) (2), which would not have applied had a transfer of the
stock of the old corporation been a part of the section 351
transaction. A similar result was avoided by the Tax Court
in Baker Commodities, Inc. by a finding that the two events,
the subscription for stock in the new corporation and the
purchase of assets from the old partnership, were simply steps
in a single transaction.
This type of issue might arise oftener except for the fact
that the Commissioner usually tries for larger stakes. Normal-
ly the sale is made in exchange for notes of the corporation.
The Commissioner's traditional attack on this has been that
the notes constitute stock of the corporation and that interest
on the notes and repayrnents of the notes represent dividends
from the corporation. Seldom does he argue that the notes
represent securities of the corporations or other boot received
in the section 351 transaction. In many cases this may be
because the result would not thereby be changed.59 But one
suspects there might be some revenue in the argument in
more cases than those in which the Commissioner presents the
argument. Were he to succeed in such argument, the corpora-
tion would lose the stepped-up basis for the property if the
notes were securities and the shareholders would receive capi-
tal gain treatment with respect to the payments on the notes.
This was the result of the George A. Nye casee where the
Tax Court rejected the thin incorporation argument but ac-
cepted the alternative contention that the ten-year insallment
note was a security and the transfer of property to the corpo-
ration for the note was a part of the section 351 transaction.
Notwithstanding the Commissioner's failure to consistent-
ly press this argument, the courts occasionally speak in terms
of the steps being interdependent. With the Commissioner
having an increasingly difficult time in the thin incorpora-
5o Upon organization of the corporation, gain would no doubt be
taxed as long term capital gain to the extent of boot, it may often be
that there would be the same amount of tax in that situation as there
would be if the sale is considered to be separate, and gain is computed
on it alone.
oo Supra, n. 25.
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tion cases it would not be unusual to see him begin to make
alternative arguments based on step transaction doctrine as
it was used in the Baker Commodities case, accepting the step-
up in basis and the capital gain treatment to the shareholde-
ers in order to avoid losing all of the potential revenue gain.
Redemptions of Stock
When one views the statutory provisions dealing with
dividends and redemptions of stock it may be understandable
that a court would take a rather strict view and limit the
applicability of the step transaction doctrine as the Supreme
Court did in the Gordon case when it dealt with the statutory
term "distribution". It was apparently this view that the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals took in 1953 in Chamberlin v. Com-
missioner,' a case which lead to the enactment of section 306
of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. In Chamberlin the cor-
poration had distributed a preferred stock dividend. The stock
was subsequently sold to an insurance company pursuant to
prior negotiations which had been carried out with the insur-
ance company relating to the terms of the preferred stock.
It was clear that the preferred stock would later be redeemed,
not later than a mandatory redemption date, thus achieving a
preferred stock bailout of corporate earnings should the court
fail to tax the stock dividends or the sale of the preferred stock
at ordinary income rates. The failure of the court to apply
the step transaction doctrine is one of the high water marks
of judicial rejection of this doctrine.62 Had the Court given
greater effect to the provisions of the 1939 code dealing with
redemption equivalent to dividends, it might have found the nec-
essary broad statutory language to tie the three events, the
stock dividend, the sale to the insurance company and the sub-
sequent redemption of the preferred stock into two transactions
having independent tax significance: first the distribution of
a cash dividend to the shareholders, and second, a purchase
of the preferred stock by the insurance company. In this way
61 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953) cert. den. 347 U.S. 918, 74 S.Ct.
516 (1954).
*2 Compare the treatment by the Tax Court of a sale of common
shortly before its redemption. The Court ignored the sale as simply a
part of a transaction involving a redemption equivalent to a dividend
in Idol, 38 T.C. 444 (1962) aff'd 319 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1963).
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the Court would not have had to deal with the subsequent
redemption transaction.
Of course there are other ways for publicly-held corpora-
tions to achieve similar results without declaring a preferred
stock dividend. If a corporation follows a systematic plan of
repurchasing its own shares, the resulting increase in the per-
centage ownership of the various stockholders who do not
sell their shares will permit them to retain their proportion-
ate interest in the corporation even if they should sell small
amounts of their shares. In this way the corporation, acting
in concert with the shareholders, can achieve the effect of a
distribution of cash to the shareholders without having it
taxed at ordinary rates. Professor Chirelstein has recently
suggested that an application of the step transaction doctrine
in this type of situation might possibly permit courts to view
either the sale of shares by a stockholder to a new shareholder
or the sale of shares to the corporation as the event by which
each shareholder realizes a taxable cash dividend.63 Each share-
holder is seen to have a choice of receiving either cash or an
increased proportionate interest in the corporation and thus
would be taxable on his share of an ordinary dividend in the
year that the corporation repurchases its stock from the pub-
lic.
There has been a substantial amount of litigation involv-
ing variations on the fact situation in Wall v. United States."
In that case an individual acquired shares of stock of a cor-
poration on an installment purchase plan and then he caused
the corporation to discharge his obligation, surrendering the
shares for redemption. He contended for an application of the
step transaction doctrine, that a portion of the shares were
in fact purchased by the corporation and that he should not
be charged with a dividend upon the redemption transaction
which the Commissioner contended was equivalent to a divi-
dend. The taxpayer lost his argument because it did not ap-
pear that there was anything more than a plan on the part
6 3 Chirelstein, Optional Redemptions and Optional Dividends: Tax-
ing the Repurchase of Common Shares, 78 Yale L. Jour. 739 (April
1969).
4 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947). See also the discussion and cases
collected in Bittker & Eustice, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS (2d ed. 1966) 294-300.
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of the taxpayer to have the corporation purchase a portion
of the shares. But seldom is there consistency in tax cases
and this is no exception in one case, it has been held that
the purchase of some of the stock by the new shareholder was
made on behalf of the corporation and the redemption was
not treated as dividend to the new shareholder.65 This was an
application of the step transaction doctrine solely because the
court found there was a plan for the corporation to acquire
the stock. It considered the purchase by the shareholder to
be just a way of carrying out that plan.
From the seller's side it is not uncommon for the two steps
to be treated as one in order to avoid dividend equivalency.
If a seller of a corporation submits a portion of his shares
for redemption and at the same time sells the remaining shares
to a third party, the events will be considered as a single trans-
action; a disposition by the selling shareholder of all of his
stock in the corporation, thus avoiding any dividend equival-
ency determination with respect to the redeemed shares.6e This
is an example of the fourth aspect of the step transaction
doctrine outlined above. A combining of the two steps into
one taxable transaction has the effect of only changing the
character of the income on the redemption transaction. It is
not necessary for the court to make any decision as to whether
or not the taxable events shall be combined into a single trans-
action. Thus, if the redemption took place on December 31,
1969 and the sale to the acquiring shareholder took place on
January 1, 1970, it is quite possible that the court would
tax the redemption in 1969 and the sale of shares in 1970 but
consider the two transactions as one in determining that the
redemption is not the equivalent of a dividend.
In the case of redemptions, the statute has codified the
step transaction in two situations. In section 302 (b) (2) a
6 Decker, 32 T.C. 326 (1959), aff'd 286 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1960).
This type of case is rare.
66 Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954); Auto Finance
Co. v. Comm., 24 T.C. 416 (1955) aff'd 229 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1956).
In Rev. Rul. 55-745, 1955-2 C.B. 223 the Commissioner announced he
would follow the Zenz case. See also Lukens v. Comm,., 246 F.2d 403
(3d Cir. 1957) (the redemption was coupled with a gift of the remain-
ing shares) and Arthur McDonald, 52 T.C. No. 8 (1969) (the redemp-
tion of preferred stock was coupled with an exchange of all the com-
mon for stock of Borden in a B reorganization).
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series of redemptions is treated as a single transaction for pur-
poses of determining whether any one of the redemptions qual-
ifies under the disproportionate redemption test of 302(b) (2).
Again, the combining of the steps is for the purpose of char-
acterizing the income from the transaction and does not have
the result of creating a single taxable transaction out of the
series. In section 304 there is an example of the corollary of
the step transaction doctrine. If two corporations are con-
trolled in common, then one event, the purchase of shares of
stock by one from the other is treated as though it were two
taxable transactions, first a contribution to the capital of the
purchasing corporation of the stock by its sister corporation
and second a distribution of a dividend by the purchasing
corporation.
Reorganizations
Reorganization transactions are extraordinarily compli-
cated statutory transactions. Frequently they involve many
events and the exchange provisions refer to actions taken pur-
suant to a plan of reorganization; consequently there is a sub-
stantial leniency on the part of the courts in what they will
require in order to characterize a series of steps as a single
reorganization transaction.
A Reorganizations
Statutory mergers and consolidations have not spawned
much controversy involving step transactions. Where combined
with spinoffs to rid the companies of unwanted assets, several
cases have involved the qualification of the spinoff under sec-
tion 355, but the merger transaction itself has not been ques-
tioned." An issue does arise, however, with respect to whether
gain or loss should be separately computed for each share of
stock exchanged where boot is involved in the exchange. In
a sense, the step transaction doctrine can be seen as having
a bearing on this issue because, if events are combined in a
single transaction, there would be reason for holding that gains
and losses should be netted. However, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in Curtis v. United States" has recently agreed
*7 Curtis v. U.S., 336 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1964) (held spinoff did
not qualify); Morris Trust v. Comm., 367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966) held
spinoff was tax free under §356); Rev. Rul. 68-603, 1968-47 I.R.B. 10
accepts the result of the Morris case.
OsSupra, n. 67.
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with the position taken by the Commissioner in Rev. Rul. 68-
2369 that losses on high basis shares cannot be netted against
gains on low basis shares. Thus, the losses would not be recog-
nized and receipt of boot results in gain being recognized on
low-basis shares.70
B Rdorganizations-Stock for Stock
The B reorganization cases have produced a variety of
step transaction issues, several of which involve creeping ac-
quisitions. One form of this occurs when the shareholder of
an acquiring corporation purchases stock of the corporation
to be acquired and this is followed by an exchange of stock
for stock between the acquiring corporation and the stock-
holders of the acquired company. The newly acquired subsidi-
ary may then be kept in existence or liquidated. Where it
remains as a subsidiary, the question of whether the share-
holder's acquisition for cash should be attributed to the cor-
poration, thus disqualifying the B reorganization as not solely
for voting stock, has been resolved in favor of tax free treat-
ment by the Commissioner in Rev. Rul. 68-562,71 with the
caveat that the shareholder was under no obligation to sur-
render the stock which he acquired in the B reorganization
and the acquiring corporation did not reimburse him for the
purchase price of the stock. Thus, the possiblity of the B reor-
ganization being disqualified is left open through an applica-
tion of the step transaction doctrine should there be any obli-
gation on the shareholder's part to make the subsequent ex-
change. Nevertheless, the Commissioner would undoubtedly
have difficulty with the latter arrangement too if the acquir-
ing corporation did not give anything but its voting stock
in the exchange.7 2
**1968-3 I.R.B. 14.
70 The consideration received has been held, in one case, Starr v.
Comm., 82 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1936) to be allocated pro rata to all
the shares exchanged, The Court specifically relied on step transaction
doctrine for this result. But a contrary result was reached in Block 'v.
Comm., 148 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1945) and Crespi v. Comm., 126 F.2d
699 (5th Cir. 1942).
71 1968-43 I.R.B. 11.
72 To establish this it would be necessary to assume a new step, not
actually taken, being a contribution of capital to the acquiring com-
pany. The transaction would then have the appearance of a transfer
of cash from the shareholder to the acquiring company and a trans-
f*r by it of the cash plus its own stock to the shareholders of the
acquired company. The Internal Revenue Service was not willing to
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Where the subsidiary is liquidated, the Commissioner has
taken the position that the reorganization may be treated as
a C reorganization78 This involves telescoping the liquida-
tion transaction and the acquisition of the stock and treating
all of this as a single transaction. A recent decision of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals involves a similar fact situa-
tion in the setting of the 1924 Internal Revenue Code.74 There a
shareholder had acquired stock of several corporations for
cash. The taxpayer corporation then acquired this stock from
the shareholder for stock and cash and immediately there-
after obtained the assets in a liquidation-type transaction.
Under the 1924 act, the acquisition of the stock from the share-
holder, isolated from his prior purchase of the stock, was a
reorganization and the Tax Court viewed the transaction in
this way, refusing to combine all the steps because of what
it believed was a lack of mutual interdependence under the
tests established in American Bantam. Car Co. The taxpayer
appealed this decision contending that all of the steps should
be combined, in which event the transaction would appear as
a purchase of assets by the taxpayer corporation. The Second
Circuit upheld this contention in a decision that rejected the
regidity of the Tax Court's approach to the step transaction
doctrine. The Court held that this doctrine did not operate
as an estoppel against taxpayers, that they had an equal right
with the Commissioner to its application. Then it delineated
go that far However, it has taken a contrary position where it is
considering the qualification of the transaction as a C reorganization.
In Revenue Ruling 69-48, 1969-6 I.R.B. 16 the Service considered an
acquisition by a parent corporation of the stock of a second corpora-
tion for cash. The parent then had one of its subsidiaries acquire
assets of the second corporation in exchange for stock of the parent com-
pany. The second corporation ended up with the parent's stock, some of
which was distributed to the parent corporation in liquidation. The
Commissioner said that the subsidiary had, in substance, paid cash
in addition to transferring stock of its parent corporation. Since the
cash paid and the liabilities assumed were in excess of twenty (20)
per cent of all the assets the Commissioner ruled that no C reorganiza-
tion resulted. In the ruling the Commissioner distinguished his own
prior Revenue Ruling 57-278, 1957-1 C.B. 124, saying that the events
described therein had not been taken pursuant to a plan.
a IReg. sec. 1.382(b)-1(a) (6). See also Comm. v. Dana, 103 F.2d
359 (3d Cir. 1939; Mente & Co., 24 B.T.A. 401 (1931); WAGE, Inc.,
19 T.C. 249 (1952).
74The South Bay Corp. v. Comm., 345 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1965),
rev'g 41 T.C. 888 (1964).
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a "transactional purpose" test, which is basically a different
articulation of the idea that if the steps are taken pursuant
to a plan which has as its purpose the achievement of a par-
ticular end result, then the steps will all be combined into
the singe transaction which would accomplish that end re-
sult. The Court said, 7
That there must be some species of integrating factor to
make it rational to define steps as parts of a single trans-
action is apparent, but it must be doubted that the degree
of integration requisite can be, or ought to be, reduced to
any rigid formula of integration or interdependence of
steps or can, or ought to, go to the extreme of requiring
that each step be devoid of business significance unless
united with one or more of the other steps. That would
import a rigidity of interpretation appropriate only to
legislative enactment and inappropriate to the interpre-
tation of a statute that is general in its formulation.
Thus the Court states that the step transaction doctrine
cannot have a single test which will be applied in every statu-
tory context. When the statute is general, a loose nexus may
be enough to bind steps together, whereas in other con-
texts it may not be enough. It didn't reject the mutual inter-
dependence test; it merely found it inappropriate in a reorga-
nization context, even where its decision had the effect of
disqualifying the transaction as a reorganization, and making
it, in effect, a purchase.
In regulation section 1.368-2 (c) the Commissioner has
treated a series of exchanges over a "relatively short period
of time such as twelve months" as a single transaction in
order to arrive at a B reorganization with no reference to a
plan or any mutual interdependency of the steps. Apparently
the Commissioner finds enough reason to bind the transac-
tions together from the mere fact that they transpired in a
short time interval. This provision became an important ele-
ment in the 1968 decision of the Court of Claims in American
Potash and Chemical Corporation v. United States.76 That case
involved a series of acquisitions of stock of a corporation which
75 Id at 704.
76399 F.2d 194 (Ct. CI. 1968) rehearing granted, 402 F.2d 1000
(Ct. Cl. 1968).
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was eventually liquidated. The acquisitions, made pursuant to
two tender offers, extended over a 14 month period and the
Commissioner argued that, since they were all pursuant to
a plan of acquiring 100% of the company, the steps should
be treated as a part of a single transaction qualifying as a
C reorganization. Thus, he contended it was necessary to com-
bine not only the acquisitions of stock but the subsequent
liquidation of the new subsidiary. The Court of Claims, first,
however, considered whether the acquisitions of stock could
be a B reorganization, using the step transaction doctrine be-
cause of the existence of the plan, it held that the entire
sequence of acquisitions of stock could not be qualified as a
B reorganization if it extended over a greater period than the
12 months used by the Commissioner as an example of a short
enough time period. This decision was particularly dependent
upon an application of the step transaction doctrine because
the statute implies, and the Commissioner's regulation states
specifically,77 that if a corporation owns a portion of the stock
of a corporation to be acquired, then a subsequent acquisition
of the control stock in exchange for voting stock of the
acquiring company will qualify, on its own, as a B reorgani-
zation. Only by combining the first acquisitions with those
made 14 months later was it possible to avoid the conclusion
that the last acquisition was a reorganization. It would be diffi-
cult indeed to say that the first acquisitions were not fruitful
without the later ones. They may have been made pursuant
to a plan of acquiring a company, but they certainly could
have been said to stand on their own. This case, then, is
another example of the liberality with respect to which a Court
will bind events together into a single transaction for pur-
poses of testing whether a reorganization has occurred. With-
out including the first tender offer with the second it would
have been an easy case for the court to hold that the second
acquisition of stock, which resulted in control, qualified as a
B reorganization. When the first event was combined with
it, the court was faced with deciding whether a series of
acquisitions extending over a period in excess of 12 months
would qualify. Construing the regulations' use of 12 months
as the upper limit of the time over which the acquisitions
could be made, the Court said this did not qualify as a creep-
ing B reorganization.
77 Reg. sec. 1.3 6 8-2(c).
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The Court then considered the argument of the taxpayer
that all of the transactions, including the subsequent liquida-
tion, should still be bound together for purposes of decid-
ing whether the Kimbell-Diamond Milling Company8 doctrine
should apply to an acquisition of assets where 334 (b) (2) does
not apply. It held that the rule would apply, and, integrating
all of the acquisitions with the liquidation into a single trans-
action because the purpose of all these events was to obtain
the assets of the acquired company, the Court held that the
tixpayer should obtain a stepped-up basis for the acquired
assets. Notwithstanding the court's verbal reliance on the
mutual interdependency theory, it appears that its decision
could be rationalized only by combining steps taken pursuant
to a single plan.79
The Court then considered whether a C reorganization
might have taken place. It recognized the validity of the Com-
missioner's position that an acquisition of a corporation pur-
suant to a B reorganization followed by a liquidation of that
corporation can constitute a C reorganization. However, the
Court said that the first acquisition must qualify as a B re-
organization in order that the entire transaction will qualify
as a C reorganization. This seems somewhat inconsistent with
its use of the step transaction doctrine in applying the Kim-
bell Diamond doctrine. If all of the steps are to be tied to-
gether in a single transaction then there seems to be no per-
suasive reason that the mere passage of a period of time
should prevent the transaction from qualifying as a C reorga-
nization. Once the decision has been made that events con-
stitute a single transaction then the period of time should be
irrelevant to the decision. 0
On rehearing the Court of Claims has indicated a willing-
ness to reconsider its opinion. The Commissioner, apparently
for the first time, effectively articulated the argument that
78 14 T.C. 74 (1950) aff'd 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951) cert. den.
342 U.S. 827, 72 S.Ct. 50 (1951).
79 If the plan has an ultimate purpose, one might still stretch the
mutual interdependence theory to the point of saying that all the steps of
a plan must be completed if any are to be fruitful in accomplishing
that purpose. This is similar to the approach of the Second Circuit
in The South Bay, supra n. 73. It would appear that this plan was
one formulated unilaterally by the acquiring company.
8oCompare May Broadeasting v. U.S., supra, n. 47.
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the second acquisition of stock could constitute a B reorgani-
zation standing on its own. If this were the case then the
Kimbel-Diamond arguably would not apply.1
In still another B reorganization issue, involving the
question of whether the acquisition is solely for voting stock,
the courts and the Internal Revenue Service have sometimes
considered whetiler a related redemption or other event may
disqualify the reorganization if it is pursuant to the particu-
lar plan. In Rev. Rul. 54-9682 where, pursuant to a plan, a
corporation transferred some of its assets to a new subsidiary
and then exchanged the stock of the the subsidiary for voting
stock of a third corporation, the Commissioner held that the
two steps must be integrated and a B reorganization did not
result because the effect of the transaction was a transfer of
assets for stock.83 And in Rev. Proc. 66-34" the Commissioner
has ruled that a sale, redemption or other disposition of stock
occurring prior or subsequent to the exchange which is "part
of the plan of reorganization" will be considered part of the
transaction in determining whether the requisite continuity
of interest exists following the exchange. But, curiously, the
Commissioner in a recently decided Tax Court case 5 conceded
that a redemption of preferred stock which was part of a plan
to transfer the ownership of the corporation to Borden in
8 1 The Court left open the question of whether there could be a
step-up in basis of assets attributable to the portion of the stock
acquired in the first acquisition, which, if the Commissioner's argument
is correct, would not have been a reorganization transaction. This de-
cision too seems somewhat suspect as it seems to combine various
aspects of Section 334(b) (2), which the court said would not apply
in the case, with the Kimbell-Diamond rule. It seems to ignore the
question of whether the Kimbell-Diamond rule should ever apply where
the stock is obtained in a tax-free transaction under section 332. Since
American Potash Chemical Corporation would not realize any gain or
loss as a result of the issue of its stock for stock of the new subsidiary,
it would seem unusual for it to get a stepped-up basis when it liqui-
dates a wholly owned subsidiary. This would seem a rather clear
case for the application of Section 332 and 334(b) (1).
82 1954-1 C.B. 111, modified by Rev. Rul. 56-100, 1956-1 C.B. 624.
83,This was similar to the situation in Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal
Co., 95 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1938) where there was a spinoff of the new
subsidiary followed by a transfer of assets for stock. The Court held
that substantially all the property was not transferred pursuant to
the second step. See discussion infra at note 92.
84 1966-2 C.B. 1232.
85 McDonald, 52 T.C. No. 8 (1969).
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exchange for Borden's voting stock was not part of the trans-
action, thus not disqualifying the B reorganization. Never-
theless the Tax Court considered the two steps as part of a
single transaction in order to determine that the redemption
of the preferred was not equivalent to a dividend. The Tax
Court said that "the redemption was merely a step in the plan
of Borden for the acquisition of E & M, so that it is the
results of the plan that are significant to us." Relying on
Zenz v. Quinlivan,8 6 the Tax Court combined the steps in
spite of the Commissioner's concession with respect to the
reorganization issue and one conjectures whether the Court
might not have used the step transaction doctrine to disqualify
the transaction as a B reorganization had it not been for the
Commissioner's concession.
C Reorganizations-Assets Acquired for Stock
The Bausch & Lomb Optical Company case, 7 decided by
the Tax Court in 1958, and affirmed by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1959, has been widely said to bar alt
creeping C acquisitions. This rule was followed in American
Potash & Chemical Corp. v. United States.8 8 However, to be
consistent with the step transaction doctrine it would appear
that if the events of acquisition are intergrated into a single
transaction, then the time interval should be ignored.8 9 Under
this view of the situation a creeping C reorganization would
Jbe possible where the acquisitions are all for stock as was
the case in American Potash, or where the boot is not in ex-
cess of 20/o of the acquired assets. It would seem that the
Court of Claims should have taken this position in American
Potash once it had decided that all steps of the acquisition,
plus the liquidation, were the equivalent of a single trans-
action for tax purposes.
At an earlier time in the development of the law, an
acquisition of assets followed by a transfer of these assets
to a new subsidiary ran into difficulty because of the step
transaction doctrine. If the transfer to the subsidiary was
pursuant to a plan, then the parent was not considered a
86 Supra, n. 66.
87 30 T.C. 602 (1958) aff'd 267 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1959).
8 8Supra, n. 76.
* Cf. May Broadcasting Co., supra n. 47.
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party to the reorganization."o The same result was reached
in a C reorganization context in the Anheuser-Busch case,91
decided by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1940. This,
however, has been changed by statute so that under section
368 (a) (2) (C) it is now possible for a C reorganization to
be accompanied by a tranfer of the assets to a new subsidiary.
By statute, the holding of the assets is not considered tran-
sitory by the parent, and no disqualification results.
In one of the earlier cases that articulated the Court's
reliance on the step transaction doctrine in reorganization
cases, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with what
is now a C reorganization. It considered, in Helvering v. Elk-
horn Coal Company92 whether there was a transfer of sub-
stantially all of the assets of the company, where some of the
assets had been distributed in a tax free spin-off shortly
before the transfer of the rest of its property. The Court said
that the steps were taken pursuant to a plan and were also
interdependent, it being necessary to complete the series to
accomplish the tax avoidance purpose of the plan. Accordingly
it held that the steps should be integrated into a single trans-
action; as a result, less than substantially all the assets were
transferred and no reorganization was achieved.
D and ,F Reorganization--Lqudation-Reincorporation
One of the most active issues currently occupying the
attention of the courts involves variations on the perennial
attempts of taxpayers to bail out corporate earnings through
transactions which terminate the existence of one corpora-
tion and continue its business in another entity.93 It is here
soHelvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454, 58 S.Ct. 309 (1938)..
91 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Helvering, 115 F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1940).
0 95 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1938).
9* In some of the earlier cases, the device used was to simply
liquidate the corporation and then transfer operating assets to a new
corporation, hence the generic term, liquidation-reincorporation trans-
action. In Survaount v. Comm., 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947) and Bard-
Parker Co., Inc. v. Comm., 218 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1954) the courts were
willing to bind the steps together to find that a -reorganization had
taken place and the assets withheld upon organization of the successor
corporation were taxed as boot. The existence of a plan was sufficient
in each case for the court to reach such result. The absence of a com-
mitment, however, in U.S. v. The Arcade Co., 203 F.2d 230 (6th Cir.
1953) and the passage of nine months between liquidation and rein-
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that the Commissioner is achieving some notable success by
emphasizing the exclusion of certain steps from the reorgani-
zation transaction. His main victories have been in two cases
decided by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Reef Corp. v.
Commissionere4 and Davant v. Commisioner.95 In both of these
cases there was a sale of assets from one corporation to a
second, followed by a liquidation of the first. This is quite
similar to the earlier Ltddon and Pebble Springs Distiding
cases (see note 93) except that the transferee corporation in
Davant was an existing corporation. It had not been orga-
nized merely for the purpose of taking over the old business.
In the Reef case, stockholders owning 52% of the stock
of a corporation organized a new one with the plan that it
take over the business of the old. To it they transferred some
of the stock which they held in the old corporation. The old
corporation then sold its assets to the new corporation for
notes of the new corporation."6 Then the notes were dis-
tributed to the stockholders in liquidation of the old corpora-
tion. All of the original shareholders received some of the
notes and, of course, some of the notes were returned to the
new corporation in exchange for the stock it had received
upon its organization. On the issue of whether there was an
corporation in Mathis, 19 T.C. 1123 (1953) were considered adequate
reasons for not applying the step transaction doctrine in similar cases.
A different form involves the organization of the successor corpora-
tion first, which then buys certain assets from the original corpora-
tion which is then liquidated. In Liddon v. Comm., 230 F.2d 304 (6th
Cir. 1956) and Pebble Springs Distilling Co. v. Comm., 231 F.2d 288
(7th Cir. 1956) the presence of a plan in this variant of the liquida-
tion-reincorporation transaction was enough to cause the courts to
apply the step transaction doctrine and find that D reorganizations had
been the net result of the steps. Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-2 C.B. 62 repre-
sents the Commissioner's new approach to this situation. See discussion
at note 97, infra. Still another variation is that a subsidiary is orga-
nized and certain assets are transferred to it, The parent then liqui-
dates. In Lewis v. Comm., 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949) the Commis-
sioner successfully contended for combining all steps into a single re-
organization with a boot distribution.
*9 Supra, n. 16.
**Supra, n. 17.
96 The facts were complicated by the use of a conduit through
whom most of the transactions were made. The Court brushed this
aside in an obvious situation for application of step transaction doc-
trine and I have ignored it in summarizing the facts of the case.
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F reorganization, the Court held (one judge dissenting) that
there was an identify of shareholders in the old and new
corporations, notwithstanding the fact that stockholders own-
ing 48% of the old corporation's shares were completely elimi-
nated in the transaction. The Court reached this result by find-
ing there were two separate and distinct transactions hav-
ing independent tax significance. It said:
"Distilled to their pure substance, two distinct and un-
related events transpired. First, the holders of 48% of
the stock in Reef Fields [the old corporation] had their
stockholdings completely redeemed. Second, new Reef was
formed and the assets of Reef Fields were transferred
to new Reef. The business enterprise continued without
interruption during both the redemption and the change
in corporate vehicles.
Much confusion flows from the fact that the corpo-
rate reorganization took place simultaneously with the
stock redemption. But taking the -Code as a standard,
these two elements were functionally unrelated. ... A
complete redemption is not a characteristic of a reorgani-
zation. . . . none of these provisions [368 (a) (1) ] focuses
on a complete redemption as a characteristic of a reorga-
nization. Congress did not have redemption of stock as
a primary purpose of any of the forms of a reorganiza-
tion. . . .
... When the primary characteristics of the reorga-
nization conform to those described by 368 (a) (1) (F), we
should parse the occurrences into their functional ele-
ments. The reorganizational characteristics present in the
instant case do not conform to those generally intended
to be covered by section 354 and therefore we should not
be blinded by the 356 boot provision. To effectuate the
intention of Congress manifested in the Code, we must
separate this transaction into its two distinctly separate
functional parts. The test of whether events should be
viewed separately or together as part of a single plan
is not temporal but functional."97
In this way the Fifth Circuit labeled as a "functional in-
91 Supm, n. 16 at 134.
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dependence test" its reason for excluding certain steps that
were clearly taken pursuant to the overall plan. Had it includ-
ed them in the reorganization transaction, it would still have
found a D reorganization, but it would have rejectea the F
reorganization on the grounds that there wasn't a sufficient
identity of interest in the two corporations. At first blush,
this may seem to be a rejection of the step transaction doc-
trine; however, the Court had clearly accepted the doctrine
with respect to many events that it found to be contemplated
by the plan and necessary for a finding of reorganization. It
simply regarded the issue with more precision as involving
not only the question of what steps to include, but which
ones to exclude; with this innovative emphasis on an aspect
of the doctrine that has always been implicit in it, the Court
was able to conclude that an F reorganization had been
achieved.
In the Reef case it is difficult to perceive how the func-
tional independence test is anything more than a way of
saying that the Court will ignore a certain part of a plan
in order to achieve a result it wants. It was clearly essential
to the plan that one of the groups of shareholders obtain 100%
control of the business. Thus, there would appear to be a
mutual interdependence between the steps. And, being taken
according to a plan, the traditional reorganization approach
would have been to combine all of them. But the Court said
there were enough steps to find an F reorganization without
including the retirement of the interests of the 48% share-
holders, and it would consider only those steps necessary to
hold that an F reorganization had taken place. At that point,
the other steps, isolated as they were from the reorganiza-
tion, could only be viewed as a redemption. In a sense this
is similar to the transactional purposes test by which the
Second Circuit explained its disagreement with the Tax Court
in The South Bay case. But, in Reef, the court found that
there were two essential purposes. One was the reorganiza-
tion; the second was the bail out of earnings of the corpora-
tion through a redemption of stock. Having found this, it
combined only those steps which were functionally important
to the first purpose and called that one transaction. The re-
maining steps were then isolated as a second transaction.
In the Davant case the Fifth Circuit again applied its
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test of functional independence to exclude certain steps from
the reorganization. Two existing corporations were each own-
ed in equal proportions by four families. One corporation,
Warehouse, sold its operating assets to another, Water, for
$700,000 in cash. Warehouse then liquidated, distributing the
proceeds of the sale plus cash of $230,000 which it had re-
tained. The Court reasoned that the businesses could have
been merged without the transfer of the $700,000 from Water
to Warehouse and thence to the stockholders or the distribu-
tion of the $230,000 in cash held by Warehouse. Thus, the
Court felt these transactions were functionally unrelated to
and independent of the reorganization transaction. Accord-
ingly, it held them to be separate distributions under section
301, saying:
"The fact that we held that the transfer of Warehouse's
assets and the 'sale'-liquidation of Warehouse's stock
should be viewed as an integrated transaction does not
mean that we are being inconsistent when we separate
the distribution of Water's cash to its stockholders. We
are merely recognizing that two distinct and functionally
unrelated types of transactions were carried on simul-
taneously-one was a dividend and the other reorganiza-
tion."98
The Court was, therefore, able to avoid the dividend-with-
in-gain limitations of the boot provisions under section 356
and measure the dividend by the earnings and profits of
both corporations. Here, however, a holding that all the steps
had to be integrated for all purposes would not have disquali-
fied the reorganization. It would have merely changed the
characterization of a portion of the cash received by the share-
holders.
Thus, the Fifth Circuit is moving towards an acceptance
of position taken by the Commissioner in Rev. Rul. 61-156.99
In that ruling, the Commissioner considered a series of events
whereby a new corporation was organized by shareholders of
** SuprM, n. 17 at 888.
9* 1961-2 C.B. 62. See also Rev. Rul. 68-349, 1968-27 I.R.B. 16 (a
section 351 type transaction, followed by liquidation of one trans-
feror, used as device to acquire assets of another person. Commissioner
finds both an F reorganization and a purchase of property).
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another corporation to buy operating assets of the latter and
continue its business. The latter then liquidated, distributing
cash to the shareholders. As part of the plan, however, a pub-
lic offering of stock was made and the shareholders divested
themselves of 55% of the stock of the new corporation. The
Commissioner disregarded this sale as a separate transaction,
saying,
The issuance of stock to new investors was not needed
to implement the dominant purpose and, therefore, the
rest of the transaction was not fruitless without it and
so dependent on it."10o
Furthermore, giving no reason for it, the Commissioner
breated the distribution of cash and notes as an independent
transaction, thus taxing it as a section 301 distribution in-
stead of as a boot distribution under section 356.101
With the support of the Fifth Circuit in Reef and Davant,
together with the rationalizing rhetoric-a "functionally in-
dependent transaction'-we may now anticipate that in cases
involving bailouts, only those steps which are necessary to
the finding of a reorganization, will be combined; other re-
demptions, distributions and the like will be treated as sepa-
rate transactions, frequently resulting in a greater tax liabil-
10o Reliance on dominant purpose and the absence of mutual inter-
dependence of the steps is suspect here because it could have been
said with equal force that the dominant purpose was to transfer the
control and operation of the business to public ownership. However,
the Fifth Circuit would point out that this could be done by a simple
sale of stock. The bailout was completely unnecessary to this transac-
tion. The liquidation and bailout, then, would be seen as having another
and separate purpose--the strip-off of corporate earnings at capital
gain rates. With respect to this purpose, the public sale was unneces-
sary. Thus, the steps taken to accomplish the two purposes were func-
tionally independent of each other.
1 This is more difficult to rationalize. Without either this step
or the public sale, the remaining steps are simply a liquidation and re-
incorporation with no boot, a simply recapitalization. But since boot
distributions are clearly contemplated in the reorganization provisions
and this was part of the plan, no good reason appears to disregard
this step. To do so goes beyond the Reef case where there was a re-
demption of shares of the 48% shareholders. It was this redemption
that led the Fifth Circuit to conclude it was not the type of event
intended by Congress to be part of a reorganization; thus it was "func-
tionally independent" of the reorganization.
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ity because of the avoidance of the boot provisions. This marks
a sort of new era for step transactions. No longer can tax
planners count on all steps of a plan being considered as part
of a single transaction. They must now face the specter of
the courts and the Commissioner choosing to combine some
steps and omit others. The attempt to bailout corporate earn-
ings has thus become more difficult and the stakes have been
raised.
Nevertheless, in neither the Reef nor the Davant cases
did new stockholders enter the picture. Where this has hap-
pened, Rev. Rul. 61-156 notwithstanding, the courts have re-
jected the idea that a reorganization has taken place.102 But
with a legitimate concern to prevent bailouts, the trend may
well be towards ignoring the change in ownership as being
functionally independent of the other steps and Rev. Rul. 61-
156 may well win the day.
The courts have also been imaginative in the area of D
reorganizations in finding transfers necessary for the event
of reorganization even though no actual transfer took place.
In a D reorganization there must be a transfer of property
by one corporation to another in exchange for stock of the
latter which is then distributed. But where the two corpora-
tions are owned by substantially identical interests, courts
have been willing to find that the exchange of stock took
place even though no stock was in fact issued by the trans-
feree corporation.0 s This would be an illustration of the corol-
lary of the step transaction doctrine. Then in a similar decision,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Moffatt v. Commis-
sioner,'" found that there had been a transfer of substantially
all the assets of one corporation to another, even though
the stockholders of what was essentially a personal service
company simply organized a new corporation which began
102Berghesh, 43 T.C. 743 (1965) aff'd 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966)
(a new stockholder got 50% of the new corporation and the court
would not ignore this purchase), and Gallagher, supra n. 34 (a 38%
interest in the old corporation was retired and 28% of the new corpo-
ration was purchased by new stockholders; again the court would not
ignore these two steps and find an identity of interest necessary for
an F reorganization).
10 Rev. Rul. 66-23, 1966-1 C.B. 67.
10463 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966).
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to do business in the same field that the old corporation had
formerly occupied. An actual tranfer of the business did not
take place. Instead, the old corporation was simply permitted
to wither away for lack of any new business. Yet, it was an
assumed transfer of the intangible value of the business that
the Court used to find a transfer of substantially all of the
assets in order to meet the requirements of section 354 (b)
(1) (A).
Continuity of Interest
Thae general requirement of reorganizations that there
be a continuity of shareholder interest has produced some step
transaction cases. These have generally been similar to the
requirement in a section 351 transaction that control exist in
the transferors immediately after the transfer of property.
Following the reorganization it sometimes happens that the
shareholders will transfer shares of stock received by them
in the exchange. There can be a difference in the reorganiza-
tion context, however, from the result in the section 351 c'ases
such as American Bantam Car Co. Thus, the Commissioner
has suggested that a disposition of stock within a five year
period of time following a reorganization could possibly de-
stroy the continuity of interest if the disposition is pursuant
to a plan or arrangement in existence at the time of the ex-
change."',- However, the Tax Court, in dealing with this ques-
tion, has been more inclined to use the same tests developed
in section 351 cases. For example, a public offering of stock
immediately after a C reorganization did not destroy the con-
tinuity of interest in Scientific Instrument Co.10 notwith-
standing that there was a plan to make this offering at the
time of the reorganization. 07
Section 355 Distributions
The most recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court
about step transactions has come in the context of an alleged
section 355 spinoff. Cotimissioner v. Gordon'0 involved the
creation of a new subsidiary by Pacific Telephone and Tele-
10 Rev. Rul. 66-23, 1966-1 C.B. 67.
1017 T.C. 1253 (1952).
10 See also Southuwell Combing Co., 30 T.C. 487 (1958) and Ameri-
can Wire Febries Corp., 16 T.C. 607 (1951).
lesSupra, n. 11.
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graph Company and the distribution of this new company to
its shareholders through two rights offerings, one of which
occurred in the year 1961 (by which 57% of the stock was
distributed) and the second of which occurred in the year
1963. There were a number of reasons why the transactions
might not have qualified for nonrecognition under section 355,
but the Supreme Court chose to rest its decision on the
grounds that the two steps taken in 1961 and 1963 could not
be combined into a single transaction fitting the description
of a distribution under section 355. Emphasizing the language
of the Code it was intrepreting the Court said,109
The code requires that "the distribution" divest the
controlling corporation of all of, or 80% control of, the
controlled corporation. Clearly, if an initial transfer of
less than a controlling interest in the controlled corpo-
ration is to be treated for tax purposes as a mere first
step in the divestiture of control, it must at least be
identifiable as such at the time it is made. Absent other
specific directions from Congress, code provisions must
be interpreted so as to conform to the basic premise of
annual tax accounting. It would be wholly inconsistent
with this premise to hold that the essential character
of a transaction, and its tax impact, should remain not
only undeterminable but unfixed for an indefinite and
unlimited period in the future, awaiting events that might
or might not happen. This requirement that the character
of a transaction be determinable does not mean that the
entire divestiture must necessarily occur within a single
tax year. It does, however, mean that if one transaction
is to be characterized as a "first step" there must be a
binding commitment to take the later steps.
This language has created some concern that the Supreme
Court may have substantially narrowed the effectiveness of
the step transaction doctrine. But, as the Court itself has
noted on numerous occasions, decisions of the Court cannot
be read abstractly as providing exhaustive definitions of statu-
tory terms; what it says about a concept must be read in the
context of the issue being discussed.110 In the context of an
100 391 U.S. 83, 96, 88 S.Ct. 1517, 1524 (1968).
1o See, e.g., Commissioner v. Glenehaw Glaa Co., 348 U.S. 426,
480-481, 75 S.Ct. 473, 476-477 (1955) where the Court said,
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interpretation of the statutory term, "distribution", the deci-
sion appears entirely understandable and correct. To bind the
two transactions into a single. distribution because taken pur-
suant to a plan, or even because it may have been convinced
of the interdependence of the steps, would create a rather
chaotic condition for section 355 transactions.
The step transaction doctrine has also recently been in-
volved in section 355 cases where a spinoff has preceded a
merger as a device to get rid of unwanted assets. In Curtis
v. United States," the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in
1964, held that the distribution would not qualify under sec-
tion 355 because the company making the distribution of the
stock was not engaged in a separate trade or business im-
mediately following the distribution. This was a strict appli-
cation of the step transaction doctrine in a section 355 con-
text where the steps were taken pursuant to a pre-existing
plan. It might have been said that the steps were at least
functionally independent of one another, and in fact, that the
spin-off under section 355 would not have been a fruitless step
to take even if not followed by the subsequent merger. In
1966, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reached an oppo-
site result in Morris Trust v. Commissioner12 in a decision
more nearly in line with the Supreme Court's decision in
Gordon. However, it also suggests that the Court may be
ready to accept the functionally independent test by which
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Reef and Davant
cases has excluded certain steps which have been taken pur-
suant to a plan. In Revenue Ruling 68-60311a the Internal Rev-
enue Service accepted the result of the Morris Trust case. It
may be that the Commissioner has taken this position to try
to press the advantage he sometimes obtains by excluding
certain steps from a reorganization or spin-off transaction
Nor can we accept respondents' contention that a narrower
reading of sec. 22 (A) is required by the Court's characteri-
zation of income in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207,
as 'the gain derived from capital, from labor or from both com-
bined.' ... In that context-distinguishing gain from capital-
the definition served a useful purpose. But it was not meant
to provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions.
11836 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1964).
112367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966).
us 1968-47 I.R.B. 10.
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in order to assert that the separate step is a distribution of
a taxable dividend.
In two situations the Commissioner has ruled that a re-
capitalization can precede a section 355 distribution even
though it is done pursuant to the same plan for making the
distribution and where the purpose of the recapitalization is
to increase the holding of the parent corporation to more than
80%/ of the voting stock. 14 The reason for doing this is that
the distribution would not qualify under section 355 unless
control of the subsidiary existed immediately before the dis-
tribution. This result is almost reminiscent of the reluctance
to apply step transaction doctrine in the section 332 liquida-
tion cases, but with some stretch of the imagination the func-
tional independence rule of Reef and Davant might also be
employed to ignore the recapitalization. At any rate it indi-
cates again that where a statute employs the term "control
immediately before" or "immediately after" that step trans-
action doctrine has a very narrow scope in which to operate.
Conclusion
This is but a sampling of the cases where the step trans-
action doctrine has an impact on the taxation of corporate
transactions, although it does include the most important of
the various issues that are frequently involved. The lack of
consistency in the decisions points up the fact that predict-
ability in this field sometimes seems to come more from, a
feel for the subject than an academic knowledge of the rhetoric
which the courts use in groping for the rubric which will
rationalize all the cases. Thus, this is probably one more area
where, in the words of Justice Brennan in his opinion in the
Duberstein case,"" decisions are frequently based "on the ap-
plication of the fact-finding tribunal's experience with the
mainsprings of human conduct to the totality of the facts" of
the cases. When he added that this would "not satisfy an
academic desire for tidiness, symmetry and precision" he
could also have been speaking of step transactions. Neverthe-
less, this doctrine is not so completely the province of the
fact-tinders as is the question of whether a gift has been
114 Rev. Rul. 69-407, I.R.B. 196940, p. 7; Rev. Rul. 56-117; 1956-
1 C.B. 180.
its Commissioner v. Duberatein, 368 U.S. 278, 80 S.Ct. 1190 (1960)
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made. Appellate courts have established some standards by
which they do review the decisions of the trial courts, and
if proper attention is given to the words of the statute which
the judges are dealing with, it may be possible to inject a
small degree of certainty in an area which intrinsically must
frustrate those who seek guidance for planning future trans-
actions. Statutes dealing formalistically with relatively simple
transactions will normally result in a restricted use of step
transaction doctrine. But in dealing with statutes describ-
ing more complicated transactions, courts will give rather
free rein to this doctrine and will tend to combine steps
whenever taken pursuant to a planned course of action. Fin-
ally, we are beginning to see more attention being given to
the purpose of the plan. Where two purposes are found which
appear to motivate the planned steps, then, if they are found
to be functionally independent, in that they relate to two
different types of transactions described in the Code, the
steps may be separated into the two transactions notwith-
standing that they are taken contemporaneously and pursuant
to a single plan.
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